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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to discuss in some detail the two different quantum schemes for duopoly
problems. We investigate under what conditions one of the schemes is more reasonable that the other
one. Using the Cournot’s duopoly example we show that the current quantum schemes require a slight
refinement so that they output the classical game in a particular case. Then we show how the amendment
changes the way of studying the quantum games with respect to Nash equilibria. Finally, we define
another scheme for the Cournot’s duopoly in terms of quantum computation.
1 Introduction
Quantum game theory, an interdisciplinary field that combines quantum theory and game theory, has been
investigated for fifteen years. The first attempt to describe a game in the quantum domain applied to finite
noncooperative games in the normal form [1], [2], [3]. The general idea (in the case of bimatrix games)
was based on identifying the possible results of the game with the basis states |i j〉 ∈ Cn ⊗ Cm. Soon after
quantum theory has also found an application in duopoly problems [4], [5]. It has been a challenging task as
the players’ strategy sets in the duopoly examples are (real) intervals and therefore there are continuum of
possible game results. The scheme presented in [4] adapts the Marinatto-Weber quantum 2×2 game scheme
[3] to the Stackelberg duopoly example. The model relates actions in the duopoly with the probabilities of
applying the bit-flip operators. On the other hand, the model introduced in [5] is a new framework compared
with the quantum 2×2 game schemes. It was defined to consider the Cournot duopoly problem where each
strategy in the classical game corresponds to a specific unitary operator. The model entangles the players’
quantities and the relation depends on a degree of the entanglement.
The Iqbal-Toor [4] and Li-Du-Massar [5] schemes undoubtedly brought new ideas to the field of quan-
tum games. These remarkable schemes have found an application in many duopoly problems. The former
scheme was further investigated, for example, in [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], the latter one in [11], [12] [13], [14],
[15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22]. The aim of the paper is to pay attention to some properties of
the quantum duopoly schemes that might be thought unsuitable (in the case of the Iqbal-Toor scheme) and
specify the Nash equilibrium analysis (in the case of the Li-Du-Massar scheme).
2 Cournot’s duopoly model
We recall the version of the Cournot model [23] with two firms that have been the subject of research in the
quantum domain. Based on [24], firm 1 and firm 2 offer quantities q1 and q2, respectively, of a homogeneous
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product. The price of the product depends on the total quantity q1 + q2. The higher the quantity is, the
lower the price of the product. More formally, the Cournot’s duopoly model defines a strategic form game
(N, {S i}i∈N , {ui}i∈N), where
1. N = {1, 2} is a set of players,
2. S i = [0,∞) is a player i’s strategy set,
3. ui is a player i’s payoff function given by formula
ui(q1, q2) = qiP(q1, q2) − cqi for q1, q2 ∈ [0,∞). (1)
Here P(q1, q2) represents the market price of the product,
P(q1, q2) =

a − q1 − q2 if q1 + q2 6 a
0 if q1 + q2 > a,
(2)
and c is a marginal cost with a > c > 0.
A Nash equilibrium is the most commonly used solution concept to study duopoly examples. It is
defined as a profile of strategies of all players in which each strategy is a best response to the other strate-
gies. In view of the Cournot duopoly it is a strategy profile (q∗1, q∗2) that satisfies the following system of
inequalities: 
u1(q∗1, q∗2) > u1(q1, q∗2)
u2(q∗1, q∗2) > u2(q∗1, q2)
for all q1, q2 ∈ [0,∞). (3)
It implies that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium (q∗1, q∗2) = ((a − c)/3, (a− c)/3) with the equilibrium
payoff (a − c)2/9 for each player.
It is appropriate at this point to note that in literature one can find (2) with requirement a > c > 0
and a statement that the Cournot duopoly has the unique Nash equilibrium. In fact, c > 0 is crucial to the
uniqueness of the equilibrium. If c = 0 and one of the players, say player 1, chooses q1 > a then the player
2’s set of best replies is [0,∞). By completely symmetric arguments, q1 ∈ [0,∞) is player 1’s best reply to
q2 > a. Thus there would be continuum many equilibria (q∗1, q∗2) such that q∗1, q∗2 > a with payoff 0 for both
players.
3 Remarks on existing quantum duopoly schemes
In this section we discuss the two main quantum approaches to the problem of duopoly. Both schemes show
how to define game with uncountable sets of strategies.
3.1 The Iqbal-Toor quantum duopoly scheme
In paper [4] the authors adapted the Marinatto-Weber quantum scheme for 2 × 2 games to the problem
of the Stackelberg’s duopoly. We restrict ourselves to the Cournot’s duopoly, where the players choose
their actions simultaneously instead of a sequential order. It does not affect the framework of the quantum
scheme but simplifies the analysis. The key idea relies on identifying players’ actions q1, q2 ∈ [0,∞) in
the classical duopoly with probabilities that determine the final state in the quantum model of 2 × 2 games.
Then, by appropriately defined measurement operators, the scheme, in particular case, is supposed to output
the classical game. Formally, the final state ρfin associated with the Iqbal-Toor scheme has the form
ρfin = xy1 ⊗ 1ρin1 ⊗ 1 + x(1 − y)1 ⊗ σxρin1 ⊗ σx
+ (1 − x)yσx ⊗ 1ρinσx ⊗ 1 + (1 − x)(1 − y)σx ⊗ σxρinσx ⊗ σx, (4)
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where x and (1 − x) (y and (1 − y)) are the probabilities of choosing by player 1 (player 2) the identity
operator 1 and the Pauli operator σx, respectively. In order to associate player i’s actions qi ∈ [0,∞) for
i = 1, 2 with final state (4) the authors defined the following probability relations:
x =
1
1 + q1
, y =
1
1 + q2
. (5)
As a result, if ρin = |00〉〈00| and the probabilities x and y are given by equation (5), the final state (4) can be
written as
ρfin =
1
(1 + q1)(1 + q2)[|00〉〈00| + q2|01〉〈01| + q1|10〉〈10| + q1q2|11〉〈11|]. (6)
Given the payoff operator Mi,
Mi = (1 + q1)(1 + q2)qi[(a − c)|00〉〈00| − |01〉〈01| − |10〉〈10|], (7)
player i’s payoff is of the form
ui(q1, q2) = tr(ρfinMi) = qi(a − c − q1 − q2) for i = 1, 2. (8)
Let us consider scheme (4)-(8) in view of the Cournot’s duopoly. The first problem we can see is that
model (4)-(8) in fact does not reproduce the game defined by (1)-(2). The payoff function (8) coincides
with formula (1) for q1 + q2 6 a but it does not take into account the market price P(q1, q2) equal to zero
in the case q1 + q2 > a. As a result, if, for example, q2 > a, player 1’s payoff function in the classical case
comes down to −cq1 and it is different in general from q1(−a − c − q1) given by (8).
The scheme (4)-(8) will generalize the classical Cournot’s duopoly if we modify operator (7) to include
the case q1 + q2 > a. Let us define
M′i =

(1 + q1)(1 + q2)qi[(a − c)|00〉〈00| − |01〉〈01| − |10〉〈10|] i f q1 + q2 6 a
(1 + q1)(1 + q2)qi(−c|00〉〈00|) i f q1 + q2 > a.
(9)
Then tr(ρfinM′i ), where ρfin is given by (6), determines the complete payoff function (1).
It is worth noting that there are many ways to define the measurement operator Mi that determines the
same outcome for ρin = |00〉〈00|. Let operators (7) for i = 1, 2 be replaced by
M′′1 = (1 + q1)(1 + q2)[(a − c)q1|00〉〈00| − q1|10〉〈10| − |11〉〈11|]
M′′2 = (1 + q1)(1 + q2)[(a − c)q2|00〉〈00| − q2|01〉〈01| − |11〉〈11|].
(10)
Then tr(ρfinM′′i ) = tr(ρfinMi) for ρin = |00〉〈00|. Simultaneously, the payoff function defined by (10) is
different from one determined by (7) for other initial states. For example, in the case of the initial state
ρin = |11〉〈11|, the final state ρfin has the form
ρfin =
1
(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
[|11〉〈11| + q2|10〉〈10| + q1|01〉〈01| + q1q2|00〉〈00|] . (11)
Then, the payoff functions corresponding to measurements M1 and M′′1 are given by formulae
tr(ρfinM1) = q1 [(a − c)q1q2 − q1 − q2] , tr(ρfinM′′1 ) = q1 [(a − c)q1q2 − q2] − 1. (12)
Equations (12) suggest that we can modify model (4)-(8) in various ways, each time obtain new results,
for example, with respect to Nash equilibria. However, the scheme (4)-(8) has a feature that may question
the correctness of the model. Namely, it outputs non-classical results already for separable initial states.
In order to see that, let us use results (11) and (12) obtained by letting ρin = |11〉〈11|. Then for arbitrary
a−c > 0 and suitably large q2 > 0 expression tr(ρfinM1) as a function of variable q1 increases monotonically
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and limq1→∞ tr(ρfinM1) = ∞. In the same manner we can see that if q1 is suitably large, the higher quantity
q2 is, the more player 2 gains. Therefore, scheme (4)-(8) with the initial state ρin = |11〉〈11| allows the
players to obtain arbitrary large payoffs. By contrast, each player’s set of available payoffs in the classical
Cournot duopoly is bounded from above. The upper bound is (a − c)2/4. It corresponds to the monopoly
quantity (a − c)/2 given by solving argmaxq1>0 u1(q1, 0).
An easy computation shows that there is no another form of Mi to obtain the scheme (4)-(8) that outputs
the classical game for ρin = | j1, j2〉〈 j1, j2|, j1, j2 = 0, 1 and is a nontrivial generalization of (1). Indeed, let
us consider the general form of a payoff operator for i = 1, 2,
Mi = (1 + q1)(1 + q2)
(
xi1|00〉〈00| + xi2|01〉〈01| + xi3|10〉〈10| + xi4|11〉〈11|
)
, (13)
where xi1, xi2, xi3, xi4 ∈ R. Suppose operator Mi, i = 1, 2 satisfies the equation
tr (ρfinMi) = qi(a − c − q1 − q2) for each j1, j2 = 0, 1. (14)
If ρin = | j1, j2〉〈 j1, j2| for j1, j2 = 0, 1, the final state ρfin described by (4) assumes the form
ρfin =
1
(1 + q1)(1 + q2)(| j1, j2〉〈 j1, j2| + q2| j1, j2 ⊕2 1〉〈 j1, j2 ⊕2 1|
+ q1| j1 ⊕2 1, j2〉〈 j1 ⊕2 1, j2| + q1q2| j1 ⊕2 1, j2 ⊕2 1〉〈 j1 ⊕2 1, j2 ⊕2 1|), (15)
where ⊕2 means addition modulo 2. Then condition (14) determines a system of four equations

x1 + q2x2 + q1x3 + q1q2x4 − qi(a − c − q1 − q2) = 0
q1q2x1 + q1x2 + q2x3 + x4 − qi(a − c − q1 − q2) = 0
q2x1 + x2 + q1q2x3 + q1x4 − qi(a − c − q1 − q2) = 0
q1x1 + q1q2x2 + x3 + q2x4 − qi(a − c − q1 − q2) = 0
(16)
that has the unique solution
x1 = x2 = x3 = x4 =
qi(a − c − q1 − q2)
(1 + q1)(1 + q2) . (17)
As a result, operator (13) comes down to the trivial payoff operator
Mi = qi(a − c − q1 − q2)1 ⊗ 1 (18)
that implies the outcome tr(ρfinMi) = qi(a − c − q1 − q2) for each density operator ρin defined on C2 ⊗ C2.
Clearly, in the game determined by (4)-(8) and ρin = |11〉〈11| there is no profitable Nash equilibrium. For
the fixed profile (q1, q2), player i would benefit by choosing q′i > qi. Thus, one may question, if the players
are able to obtain superior payoffs compared to the classical case. However, as it has been mentioned, that
model does not take into account the proper price function (2). It cannot then be considered in terms of a
generalization of the Cournot model. Let us now replace (7) with (9). This gives
u
Q
i (q1, q2) = tr(ρfinM′i ) =

qi
[(a − c)q1q2 − q1 − q2] if q1 + q2 6 a,
−cq1q2 if q1 + q2 > a.
(19)
Let us assume now that a > (c +
√
c2 + 16)/2 and consider a strategy profile (q∗1, q∗2) = (a/2, a/2). If
q1 6 a/2 then
u
Q
1
(
a
2
,
a
2
)
− uQ1
(
q1,
a
2
)
=
(
a
2
− q1
) [(
a
2
(a − c) − 1
) (
a
2
+ q1
)
− a
2
]
>
(
a
2
− q1
) (
a
2
+ q1 −
a
2
)
=
(
a
2
− q1
)
q1 > 0, (20)
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Figure 1: The graphs of ui(a/3, a/3) and uQi (a/2, a/2) for initial numbers a > (c +
√
c2 + 16)/2, where
c = 3.
where the second to last inequality follows from the fact that the assumption a > (c +
√
c2 + 16)/2 implies
(a/2)(a − c) − 1 > 1. In the case q1 > a/2,
u
Q
1
(
q1,
a
2
)
= −cq1
a
2
< 0 =
(
a
2
)2
−
(
a
2
)2
6
(
a
2
)2 (a
2
(a − c) − 1
)
−
(
a
2
)2
= u
Q
1
(
a
2
,
a
2
)
. (21)
We have thus proved that q∗1 = a/2 is a player 1’s best response to q∗2 = a/2. In an exactly similar way we
can show that q∗2 = a/2 is a best response to q∗1 = a/2. This means that (q∗1, q∗2) is a Nash equilibrium. We
now conclude from comparing the equilibrium payoffs in the classical Cournot duopoly and uQi (a/2, a/2)
defined by function (19) that the latter payoff can be much greater. For example (see also the graphs in
Fig 1), if a = 30 and c = 3, the classical equilibrium outcome is 81 whereas uQi (a/2, a/2) = 90675.
It is worth noting that the problem of nonclassical results determined by the basis states ρin spreads to
other duopoly examples based on scheme (4)-(8). Let us recall the problem of Bertrand duopoly studied
in [8]. In this case two firms (players) compete in price. Let p1 and p2 be the prices chosen by player 1 and
2, respectively. Then the product quantities are given by
q1 = a − p1 + bp2, q2 = a − p2 + bp1, where 0 < b < 1, (22)
and the payoff functions are
u1(p1, p2) = (a − p1 + bp2)(p1 − c), u2(p1, p2) = (a − p2 + bp1)(p2 − c). (23)
The quantum scheme for the problem (22)-(23) proceeds similarly to (4)-(8) where each qi in (5) is replaced
with pi (for the detailed description we refer the reader to [8]). It was designed to consider the initial state
of the form
|Ψin〉 = cos γ|00〉 + sin γ|11〉, γ ∈ [0, 2pi).
Then the resulting payoff functions uQ1 and u
Q
2 depend on a triple (p1, p2, γ) and are equal to
u
Q
1 (p1, p2) = (a − p1 + bp2)
[
(p1 − c) cos2 γ +
(
p2 + p1
(
−1 − cp2 + p22
))
sin2 γ
]
,
u
Q
2 (p1, p2) = (a − p2 + bp1)
[
(p2 − c) cos2 γ +
(
p1 + p2
(
−1 − cp1 + p21
))
sin2 γ
]
.
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Thus, in particular, if ρin = |11〉〈11| and we consider strategy profile in the form of (0, p2), p2 > 0 the
formulae uQ1 (p1, p2) comes down to
u
Q
1 (p1, p2) = (a + bp2)p2, uQ2 (p1, p2) = −(a − p2)p2. (24)
Now, it is easily seen that the players’ payoffs approach infinity as p2 approaches infinity. This is clearly a
nonclassical result as in the classical case (23)
sup
p1,p2>0
(u1(p1, p2) + u2(p1, p2)) = [a − c(1 − b)]
2
2(1 − b) < ∞. (25)
The question now arises: given the results above, can the quantum scheme (4)-(9) be considered rea-
sonable? The requirement taken from quantum schemes for finite strategic games is satisfied: the duopoly
example defined by (1)-(2) can be obtained from (4)-(9). Thus, in this sense, the quantum duopoly based
on the Marinatto-Weber scheme appears to be well-defined. However, there is also some implicit condition
embeded in the framework for quantum playing finite strategic games. Namely, each payoff profile gen-
erated by the quantum scheme lies in the convex hull of set of payoff profiles determined by the classical
game. For example, in the Marinatto-Weber and the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein schemes for 2 × 2 games
the payoff operator has the form M = ∑ j1 , j2=0,1 x j1, j2 | j1, j2〉〈 j1, j2|, where x j1 , j2 ∈ R2 are the four payoff pairs
that define the 2 × 2 game. Then for any density operator ρfin on C2 ⊗ C2 determined by the players, the
resulting payoff pair tr(ρfinM) is a convex combination of points x ji , j2 . If we assumed that equal convex
hulls of payoff profiles generated by both the classical and quantum game were a necessary condition for
the quantum scheme to be a correct one, then the protocol (4)-(9) would not be valid.
3.2 The Li-Du-Massar quantum duopoly scheme
The quantum protocol introduced in [5] is another way to define the problem of duopoly in the quantum
domain. Let us recall the formal description of this scheme [5, 25].
Let |Ψin〉 = |00〉 be the initial state and J(γ) = exp
{
−γ
(
a†1a
†
2 − a1a2
)}
, γ > 0, where a†i (ai) is the creation
(annihilation) operator of player i’s electromagnetic field. The player i’s strategies depend on xi ∈ [0,∞)
and they are given by formula
Di(xi) = exp

xi(a†i − ai)√
2
, xi ∈ [0,∞)
 , i = 1, 2. (26)
A quantum measurement on state |Ψfin〉,
|Ψfin〉 = J(γ)†(D1(x1) ⊗ D2(x2))J(γ)|00〉, (27)
described by the observables Xi =
(
a†i + ai
)
/
√
2, i = 1, 2 gives the quantities
q1 = 〈Ψfin|X1|Ψfin〉 = x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ,
q2 = 〈Ψfin|X2|Ψfin〉 = x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ. (28)
Equations (28) are obtained by using the formula (see also [26])
eλABe−λA = B coshλ
√
β +
[A, B]√
B
sinh λ
√
β,
where the operators A and B satisfy the relation [A, [A, B]] = βB, β-constant. Given (28) the payoff
functions are
u
Q
1 (x1, x2) = (x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ)[a − c − eγ(x1 + x2)]
u
Q
2 (x1, x2) = (x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ)[a − c − eγ(x1 + x2)]
(29)
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that simply follow from the payoff function (1) for q1 + q2 6 a.
Note that, in contrast to the previous scheme (4)-(8), the Li-Du-Massar scheme does not act on the
payoff function ui but merely defines a new relation between the players’ choices x1, x2 and the resulting
quantities q1, q2. The values q1, q2 given by (28) are still the real numbers from set [0,∞). It implies that
the set of available payoffs determined by the Li-Du-Massar scheme coincides with the one of the classical
problem. However, similarly to (4)-(8), the Li-Du-Massar scheme does not take into account the complete
market price function (1), i.e., the case P(q1, q2) = 0 if q1 + q2 > a. As a consequence, one cannot say that
model defined by (26)-(29) generalizes the Cournot duopoly problem. Reffering to (1), the payoff function
u
Q
1(2)(x1, x2) should be extended to take the form
u
Q
1(2)(x1, x2) =

(
x1(2) cosh γ + x2(1) sinhγ
) [a − c − eγ(x1 + x2)] if eγ(x1 + x2) 6 a,
−c (x1(2) cosh γ + x2(1) sinh γ) if eγ(x1 + x2) > a. (30)
Then if γ = 0, formula (30) comes down to (1).
The question is now: whether the quantum scheme with payoff function (29) and (30) have different
sets of Nash equilibria. Similarly to the classical case, if c = 0, each profile (x∗1, x∗2) such that x1, x2 > e−γa
is a Nash equilibrium in the case (30). The players obtain the payoff 0 and any unilateral deviation from the
equilibrium strategy does not change the player’s payoff. If c > 0 then there is a unique Nash equilibrium
(x∗1, x∗2) that coincides with the one determined in [5]. However, the proof of existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium needs a more sophisticated reasoning compared with [5]. In what follows, we give a rigorous
proof of the following fact:
Proposition 1 If the marginal cost c is positive, the quantum Cournot duopoly defined by the Li-Du-Massar
scheme with the payoff function (30) has the unique Nash equilibrium (x∗1, x∗2) such that
x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
(a − c) cosh γ
1 + 2e2γ
. (31)
Proof The proof proceeds along the same lines as the proof in the classical Cournot duopoly [24]. We use
the fact that a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (x∗1, x∗2) where x∗1 and x∗2 are mutually best replies. First,
we determine the best reply function β1(x2) of player 1. It can be obtained by solving the maximization
problem
argmax
x1∈[0,∞)
u
Q
1 (x1, x2) for a given value x2 > 0. (32)
Let us first consider the case when x2 6 ae−γ. Then the maximization problem (32) comes down to maxi-
mizing the function
(x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ)(a − c − eγ(x1 + x2)). (33)
For case 0 6 x2 6 (a − c)e−2γ cosh γ the maximum point is x1 = [(a − c) cosh γ − e2γx2]/(e2γ + 1). To show
that x1 is the unique best reply in this case let us note that x2 6 (a− c)e−2γ cosh γ 6 (a − c) cosh γ for γ > 0.
Thus we have
eγ(x1 + x2) = (a − c) cosh γ + x22 coshγ 6 a − c. (34)
This means that the player 1’s payoff given by (33) is nonnegative. As a result, player 1 would make a loss
by choosing x1 such that x1 + x2 > ae−γ. For (a − c)e−2γ cosh γ < x2 6 ae−γ function (33) of variable x1 is
strictly decreasing on [0,∞). Hence, it is optimal for player 1 to take x1 = 0 and obtain (a−c−eγx2)x2 sinh γ.
Note also that player 1 would not be willing to take x1 such that x1 + x2 > ae−γ. Indeed, since x2 6 ae−γ and
γ > 0, it is true that
(a − c − eγx2)x2 sinhγ = (a − eγx2)x2 sinh γ − cx2 sinh γ
> −cx2 sinh γ > −c(x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ) (35)
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Figure 2: The graphs of the best reply functions β1(x2) and β2(x1) given by (36) and (37). The intersection
represents the unique Nash equilibrium in the game.
for each x1 > 0.
If x2 > ae−γ, problem (32) is equivalent to argmaxx1∈[0,∞){−c(x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ)}. In this case it is
optimal player 1 to choose x1 = 0. Summarizing, player 1’s best reply function is as follows
β1(x2) =

(a−c) cosh γ−e2γx2
e2γ+1 if x2 6 (a − c)e−2γ cosh γ
0 if x2 > (a − c)e−2γ cosh γ.
(36)
Similar arguments to those above show that the player 2’s best reply function β2(x1) is given by formula
β2(x1) =

(a−c) cosh γ−e2γx1
e2γ+1 if x1 6 (a − c)e−2γ cosh γ
0 if x1 > (a − c)e−2γ cosh γ.
(37)
We recall that a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile at which each player chooses a best response to the
other players’ strategies. As a result, the Nash equilibria in the Li-Du-Massar scheme with (30) can be
identified with the points of intersection of graphs determined by the best reply functions β1(x2) and β2(x1).
The graphs are drawn in Fig 2. In this way, there is the unique Nash equilibrium. It is obtained by solving
the system of linear equations

x1 =
(a−c) cosh γ−e2γ x2
e2γ+1
x2 =
(a−c) cosh γ−e2γ x1
e2γ+1 .
(38)
Thus, the solution coincides with the result provided in [5]. Namely, x∗1 = x∗2 = (a − c)(2e2γ + 1)−1 cosh γ. 
It is worth noting that the quantum extension of the Cournot duopoly introduced in [5] affects the quantities
q1 and q2 and makes use of the payoff function of the classically played duopoly. This implies that the set of
payoff profiles generated by the Li-Du-Massar scheme with (30) is equal to one determined by function (1).
In particular, by solving the maximization problem
argmax
q1,q2∈[0,∞)
(
u
Q
1 (x1, x2) + uQ2 (x1, x2)
)
= argmax
q1 ,q2∈[0,∞)
eγ(x1 + x2) (a − c − eγ(x1 + x2)) (39)
we obtain the set {(x1, x2) : x1 + x2 = (a − c)e−γ/2}. Hence, for each γ ∈ [0,∞), a symmetric Pareto optimal
outcome uQi ((a − c)e−γ/4, (a − c)e−γ/4) is equal to (a − c)2/8 in both the classical and quantum case.
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4 Another example of the quantum Cournot duopoly scheme
The Li-Du-Massar scheme with the refined payoff function (30) is defined in accordance with the quantum
protocols for finite games. The scheme generalizes the classicaly played Cournot duopoly and it keeps the
set of feasible payoff profiles unchanged. We saw in subsection 3.1 that the scheme based on the Marinatto-
Weber approach for bimatrix games does not satisfy the latter condition. The question now is whether
these two requirements on a quantum scheme imply the unique quantum model for the Cournot duopoly
problem. The two well-known and quite different quantum schemes for bimatrix games, introduced in [2]
and [3] suggest that the answer ought to be negative. In fact, this is the case. We can define another scheme
that is consistent with the requirements above. In what follows, we give an example of a scheme that is
similar in concept to the Li-Du-Massar scheme. The idea is based on ‘entangling’ the players’ quantities x1
and x2 in order to obtain q1 = ax1 + bx2 and q2 = ax2 + bx1 for some real numbers a and b.
Let |Ψin〉 = |00〉 be the initial state and I(γ) be an entangling operator,
I(γ) = 1⊗2 cos γ + iσ⊗2x sinγ, γ ∈ [0, pi/4], (40)
where 1 and σx are the identity and Pauli operator X, respectively, defined on C2. The resulting state is then
given by
|Ψfin〉 = I(γ)|00〉 = cos γ|00〉 + i sinγ|11〉. (41)
Let us identify the player i’s strategies with xi ∈ [0,∞) for i = 1, 2. The values x1 and x2 determine two
positive operators {M1(x1, x2), M2(x1, x2)} given by formula
Mi(x1, x2) =

x1|0〉〈0| + x2|1〉〈1| if i = 1
x2|0〉〈0| + x1|1〉〈1| if i = 2.
(42)
The measurement defined by Mi(x1, x2) determines the quantities q1 and q2 in the following way:
q1 = tr(M1ρ1), q2 = tr(M2ρ2), (43)
where ρ1 and ρ2 are the reduced density operators tr2(|Ψfin〉〈Ψfin|) and tr1(|Ψfin〉〈Ψfin|) of the first and second
qubit, respectively. As a result
q1 = x1 cos2 γ + x2 sin2 γ, q2 = x2 cos2 γ + x1 sin2 γ. (44)
Referring to function (1) we obtain the following players’ payoff functions:
u
Q
1(2)(x1, x2) =

(
x1(2) cos2 γ + x2(1) sin2 γ
)
(a − c − x1 − x2) if x1 + x2 6 a
−c
(
x1(2) cos2 γ + x2(1) sin2 γ
)
if x1 + x2 > a.
(45)
Certainly, scheme (40)-(45) is a generalization of the classically played Cournot duopoly. If γ = 0 then
payoff function (45) boils down to function (1). Since the scheme uses the classical payoff function, the
corresponding set of feasible payoffs remains the same as in the classical case.
Proposition 2 If the marginal cost is positive, the set N of Nash equilibria in the game defined by scheme (40)-
(45) is as follows:
N =

{( (a−c) cos2 γ
2 cos2 γ+1 ,
(a−c) cos2 γ
2 cos2 γ+1
)}
if γ , pi/4{(
x, a−c2 − x
)
, x ∈
[
0, a−c2
]}
if γ = pi/4. (46)
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Figure 3: The graphs of the best reply functions β1(x2) and β2(x1) given by (51) and (52). The intersection
represents the unique Nash equilibrium in the game.
Proof The proof is similar in spirit to that of Proposition 1. Let x2 satisfy x2 6 a. For x2 6 (a−c) cos2 γ the
solution of argmaxq1∈[0,∞) u
Q
1 (x1, x2) is x1 = [(a − c) cos2 γ − x2]/(2 cos2 γ) as a global maximum of function
of variable x1, (
x1 cos
2 γ + x2 sin2 γ
)
(a − c − x1 − x2) (47)
If (a − c) cos2 γ < x2 6 a then function (47) is monotonically increasing on [0,∞). Hence, in this case
argmax
x1∈[0,∞),x1+x26a
u
Q
1 (x1, x2) = {0}. (48)
Since x2 6 a, we have
u
Q
1 (0, x2) = x2(a − x2) sin2 γ − cx2 sin2 γ > −cx2 sin2 γ > −c
(
x1 cos
2 γ + x2 sin2 γ
)
(49)
for each x1 > 0. It implies that
argmax
x1∈[0,∞),x1+x26a
u
Q
1 (x1, x2) = argmax
x1∈[0,∞)
u
Q
1 (x1, x2). (50)
If x2 > a, then uQ1 (x1, x2) = −c
(
x1 cos
2 γ + x2 sin2 γ
)
. Hence, it is optimal for player 1 to choose x1 = 0.
Summarizing, we have the following form of β1(x2):
β1(x2) =

(a−c) cos2 γ−x2
2 cos2 γ if 0 6 x2 6 (a − c) cos2 γ
0 if x2 > (a − c) cos2 γ.
(51)
Similar arguments to those above show that
β2(x1) =

(a−c) cos2 γ−x1
2 cos2 γ if 0 6 x1 6 (a − c) cos2 γ
0 if x1 > (a − c) cos2 γ.
(52)
The best response function β1(x2) and β2(x1) are given in Fig 3. Solving the system of equations determined
by β1(x2) and β2(x1), 
x1 =
(a−c) cos2 γ−x2
2 cos2 γ
x2 =
(a−c) cos2 γ−x1
2 cos2 γ
(53)
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Figure 4: The equilibrium payoff (54) depending on the entanglement parameter γ.
we obtain for γ , pi/4 the unique solution (x∗1, x∗2), x∗1 = x∗2 = [(a− c) cos2 γ]/(2 cos2 γ+1). If γ = pi/4, there
are infinitely many solutions (x∗1, x∗2) such that x∗1 + x∗2 = (a − c)/2. This completes the proof. 
The payoff corresponding to the Nash equilibrium depends on γ and is given by
u
Q
i (x∗1, x∗2) =
(a − c)2 cos2 γ
2 cos2 γ + 1
, γ ∈
[
0, pi
4
]
. (54)
In particular, if the final state |Ψfin〉 is maximally entangled (γ = pi/4), the resulting equilibrium payoff
u
Q
i (x∗1, x∗2) is Pareto optimal and equal to (a − c)2/8.
5 Conclusions
The theory of quantum games has no rigorous mathematical structure. There is no formal axioms, def-
initions that would give clear directions of how a quantum game ought to look like. In fact, only one
condition is taken into consideration. It says that a quantum game ought to include the classical way of
playing the game. As a result, this allows one to define a quantum game scheme in many different ways.
The schemes we have studied in section 3 are definitely ingenious. They make a significant contribution
to quantum game theory. Our work has shown which of the two schemes (the Iqbal-Toor scheme or the
Li-Du-Masasr scheme) might be considered more reasonable. The payoffs in the game determined by the
Iqbal-Toor scheme can go beyond the classical set of feasible payoffs compared with the Li-Du-Masasr
scheme. Therefore, one may question whether the former scheme outputs the game played in a quantum
manner or just another classical game. It might not mean that the latter scheme with (30) gives the defini-
tive form of the quantum Cournot duopoly. At the end of the paper we defined another scheme in terms of
quantum theory.
We can conclude that the question of quantum duopoly is still an open problem even in the simplest
case of the Cournot duopoly. It is definitely worth investigating as other new schemes may bring us closer
to specify a strict definition of a quantum game.
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